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Stable Shareholdings, the Decision Horizon Problem, and 




Previous studies argue that stable shareholdings with long term horizon create incentives 
for managers to pursue long term stable earnings and restrict them from conducting myopic 
behavior. Due to their asymmetric payoff function, stable shareholders are not expected to 
respond favorably to temporarily inflated earnings that cause higher volatility of earnings. 
To  test  the  implications  of  this  argument,  we  focus  on  cross shareholdings  and  stable 
shareholdings by financial institutions as stable shareholdings in Japan and investigate the 
effect  of  these  ownership  structures  on  two  earnings  management  patterns:  earnings 
smoothing  and  big  bath.  Consistent  with  our  hypothesis,  we  find  that  under  the  stable 
ownership  structure,  stable  shareholders  encourage  managers  to  perform  earnings 
smoothing, which decreases earnings volatility, and discourage them from engaging in big 
bath,  which  increases  earnings  volatility.  Further,  additional  analysis  reveals that  stable 
shareholdings  reduce  incentives  for  managers  to  reduce  discretionary  expenditure  for 
short term  earnings  benchmarks;  this  implies  that  stable  shareholdings  can  reduce  the 
possibility of the myopic problem. Our results suggest that stable shareholders pressurize 
managers to create stable earnings strings through earnings management and prevent them 
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1 Introduction 
Bushee (1998) provides evidence that institutional ownership with short term investment 
horizons induces managers to conduct earnings management to attain short term earnings 
goals.  In  contrast,  some  studies  and  anecdotes  argue  that  stable  shareholdings  with 
long term investment horizons restrict managers from engaging in such myopic behavior 
and create incentives for these managers to pursue long term stable earnings (Abegglen and 
Stalk 1985; Porter 1992; Jacobson and Aaker 1993; Osano 1996). 
This study examines the implications of the aforementioned argument in relation to 
stable shareholdings from the viewpoint of earnings management. In particular, we focus on 
cross shareholdings  and  stable  shareholdings  by  financial  institutions  as  stable 
shareholdings in the Japanese equity market, and investigate the effect of these ownership 
structures on major earnings management patterns: earnings smoothing and big bath. In 
accordance  with  the  above  arguments,  we  predict  that  stable  shareholders  pressurize 
managers to create stable earnings strings through earnings management. 
The reason we focus on the corporate ownership structure of Japanese firms is that it 
has worthwhile features for our investigation compared to the structures of US firms. A 
distinctive  feature  of  the  Japanese  stock  market  is  that  both  stable  shareholdings  with 
longer  investment  horizons  and  foreign  shareholdings  with  shorter  investment  horizons 
exist  simultaneously.  This  unique  ownership  structure  provides  a  significant  research 
setting  for  studying  the  relationship  between  earnings  management  and  the  investment 
horizon problem due to ownership structure. 
Bushee  (1998)  finds  that  greater  ownership  by  institutions  with  short term 4 
 
investment  horizons  increases  the  probability  that  managers  will  reduce  investment  in 
research and development (R&D) to avoid earnings declines. The result suggests that large 
shareholdings  by  institutions  encourage  managers  to  sacrifice  R&D  to  meet  short term 
earnings goals rather than maximize long term value. Such management behavior is often 
called  the  myopic  problem  or  the  decision  horizon  problem  (Smith  and  Watts  1982; 
Narayanan 1985; Stein 1989; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Porter 1992; Cheng 2004). 
In contrast to Bushee’s (1998) research, our study focuses on examining the effect of 
stable shareholdings with long term investment horizons on earnings management behavior. 
In  Japan,  there  exist  stable  shareholders  that  are  highly  concentrated  among  corporate 
stockholders with financial institutions. In this case, firms are closely connected; they affect 
each other through cross holdings of equity ownership and generally depend on a large 
commercial bank (i.e., the main bank) for their primary banking needs (Hoshi et al. 1990, 
1991; Aoki and Patrick 1994; Douthett and Jung 2001; Shuto and Kitagawa 2011).
1  These 
stable shareholders have a high monitoring ability and a strong incentive to monitor firms 
because  they  share  close  relationships  with  these  firms  as  creditors  or  trade  partners 
(Diamond 1984; Aoki and Patrick 1994; Osano 1996; Douthett and Jung 2001; Isagawa 
2007;  Shuto  and  Kitgawa  2011).  By  using  their  high  monitoring  ability,  these  stable 
shareholders can control firm managers’ earnings management decisions. 
According  to  some  studies  and  anecdotes,  stable  shareholdings  are  expected  to 
restrict managers from engaging in myopic behavior and induce them to make long term 
investments or financial decisions (Abegglen and Stalk 1985; Porter 1992; Jacobson and 
                                                           
1  It is widely known that the keiretsu system is the most typical form of organization in such corporate 
groups. 5 
 
Aaker 1993; Osano 1996). In our research context, we expect that firm managers with 
stable shareholdings have incentives to consider long term stable earnings strings rather 
than short term earnings that increase earnings volatility.   
Their preference for less volatile earnings is rationally explained by their asymmetric 
payoff function. Due to this function, stable shareholders are more concerned with potential 
losses  than  with  potential  gains,  particularly  for  shareholdings  by  financial  institutions 
(Watts,  1993).  In  other  words,  debt  holders  such  as  financial  institutions  are  more 
concerned about the downside risk of borrowing firms since these debt holders could lose 
their  promised  payments  (i.e.,  principal  and  interest)  in  serious  cases.  Because  greater 
uncertainty  about  profits  implies  greater  risks  such  as  excess  bonus  or  dividends,  the 
reduction of earnings volatility could be a useful way to reduce the downside risk. Further, 
cross shareholders are also likely to be more interested in the survival of the firms, as they 
permit  managers  to  develop  operations  according  to  the  long term  perspective.  This 
intention is consistent with the interests of the debt holders, who have greater concerns 
about  the  default  risk  of  the  firms  (Shuto  and  Kitagawa  2011).  Consistent  with  these 
arguments,  Nakatani  (1984),  a  prominent  study  on  the  Japanese  corporate  governance 
system, provides evidence that the variations in the operating income of keiretsu affiliated 
firms that comprise shareholders through cross shareholdings and main bank relationships 
is significantly smaller than other independent firms. 
We  predict  that  this  stable  earnings  stream  is  formed  by  earnings  management 
resulting from pressure by stable shareholders. We hypothesize that stable shareholders (1) 
encourage  firm  managers  to  conduct  earnings  smoothing,  which  decreases  earnings 6 
 
volatility and (2) discourage them from engaging in big bath, which increases earnings 
volatility. As many studies indicate, earnings smoothing can create earnings strings that are 
less  volatile  and  more  stable;  this  is  a  desirable  strategy  for  managers  who  consider 
long term business prospects. 
Big bath is usually defined as extreme earnings decreasing behavior that is aimed at 
increasing future potential earnings (Healy 1985). Prior studies reveal that managers have 
an incentive to engage in big bath behavior during the period of CEO turnover, no bonus 
payment,  organizational  stress,  and  reorganization  (Pourciau  1993;  Murphy  and 
Zimmerman 1993; Healy 1985). Because of the property of accruals reversal, managers can 
enhance the probability of future period earnings through the big bath strategy. Managers 
with stable shareholdings are less likely to follow this strategy because it increases earnings 
volatility within a future period. 
Our results are consistent with the above hypotheses. First, we find that managers 
conduct  earnings  smoothing  as  stable  shareholdings  increase;  this  suggests  that  stable 
shareholders  play  a  monitoring  role  in  creating  pressure  for  long term  stable  earnings 
strings. Further, to compare the findings of stable shareholdings, we examine the effect of 
foreign  ownership—which  can  be  assumed  as  shareholders  with  short term  decision 
horizons,  such  as  Bushee’s  (1998)  institutional  ownership  with  short term  horizon—on 
earnings  smoothing  behavior.  The  results  indicate  that  foreign  ownership  restricts  firm 
managers from engaging in earnings smoothing; consistent with our prediction, this is in 
contrast to the findings on stable shareholdings. 
Second, we find that stable shareholdings are negatively associated with big bath 7 
 
behavior; this suggests that stable shareholders can prevent firm managers from engaging in 
such behavior. Finally, our additional analysis, which aims at replicating previous studies 
on  discretionary  expenditures,  reveals  that  stable  shareholdings  reduce  incentives  for 
managers to cut discretionary expenditures such as R&D and advertising expenses to meet 
short term  earnings  benchmarks.  In  other  words,  stable  shareholdings  could  reduce  the 
possibility  of  the  myopic  problem,  thereby  supporting  our  prediction  that  they  would 
restrict managers from engaging in only myopic behavior. These results suggest that stable 
shareholdings  in  Japan  create  less  volatile  and stable  earnings  strings  through  earnings 
management. 
This study contributes to the literature and understanding of accounting practice. First, 
our study contributes to previous studies that examine the relationship between ownership 
structure and earnings management by adding empirical evidence on investment horizon. 
Although  many  studies  focus  on  the  relationship  between  ownership  structure  and 
discretionary accruals in US firms (Warfield et al. 1995; Chung et al. 2002; Cornett et al. 
2008) and Japanese firms (Douthett and Jung 2001; Teshima and Shuto 2008), few examine 
the effect of ownership structure on earnings management from the investment horizon 
perspective. Most prior studies, particularly those on Japanese firms, tend to emphasize the 
monitoring  role  of  institutional  ownership  in  their  hypothesis  development  and  fail  to 
consider the impact of investment horizon of ownership structure on managerial behaviors. 
Second,  this  study  makes  an  incremental  contribution  to  studies  focusing  on  the 
relationship between earnings management and the decision horizon problem that results 
from  the  ownership  structure.  Bushee  (1998)  is  the  only  study  that  identifies  that 8 
 
institutional ownership with short term decision horizons leads to earnings management for 
achieving short term earnings goals; however, this study does not examine the effect of 
shareholdings  with  long term  investment  horizons  and  long term  business  prospects  on 
earnings management behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that 
examines  the economic  consequence  of  stable  shareholdings  on earnings  management.
2 
Both Bushee (1998) and this study analyze the presence of institutional shareholdings, but 
both studies have contrary results. The results suggest that the effect of the investment 
horizon is critical in discussing the monitoring role of institutional ownership. 
Finally,  this  study  advances  our  understanding  of  earnings  management  patterns. 
Most prior studies assume earnings management to be managerial opportunistic behaviors, 
and  focus  on  whether  earnings  management  exists  or  not  because  of  the  difference  in 
ownership  structure.  In  general,  these  studies  provide  evidence  that  monitoring  by 
institutional  investors  deters  managers  from  engaging  in  opportunistic  earnings 
management using discretionary  accruals  (Douthett  and  Jung  2001;  Chung  et  al.  2002; 
Cornett et al. 2008). 
On the other hand, we reveal that under institutional stable shareholdings, earnings 
smoothing is allowed and big bath is restricted. It should be noted that while some types of 
earnings management can be pursued under certain ownership structures, there exists an 
earnings  management  pattern  that  is  restricted  to  such  management  under  the  same 
                                                           
2  Although Bushee (1998) also provides evidence that large institutional ownerships that do not have high 
portfolio turnover are less likely to cut R&D to reserve an earnings decline, he does not particularly focus on 
stable shareholdings with long term investment horizons as we do in our study. 9 
 
ownership structure.
3  Our finding that stable shareholdings create less variable earnings 
through  earnings  management  has  important  implications  for  the  setting  of  accounting 
standards and for regulation bodies. 
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  in  the  following  manner.  Section  2 
summarizes  prior  studies  and  develops  the  hypotheses.  Section  3  explains  the  research 
design for testing our hypotheses. Section 4 outlines the sample selection procedure and 
describes the variables used in this analysis. Section 5 reports the empirical results on the 
relationship between stable shareholdings and earnings management. Section 6 summarizes 
the results of additional analyses. Finally, Section 7 concludes the study with a summary. 
 
 
2 Prior studies and hypotheses development 
2.1 Decision horizon problem and earnings management 
Prior  studies  provide  evidence  that  the  managerial  decision  horizon  problem  leads  to 
earnings management behavior. Dechow and Sloan (1991) indicate that managers reduce 
R&D spending to increase short term earnings when they approach retirement. Baber et al. 
(1991) find that managers reduce R&D expenses for opportunistically boosting earnings to 
avoid decreases and losses in earnings. As stated above, these behaviors are usually called 
the myopic problem or the decision horizon problem (Smith and Watts 1982; Narayanan 
1985; Stein 1989; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Porter 1992; Cheng 2004). 
                                                           
3  Although we reveal that stable shareholdings prefer earnings smoothing, we cannot determine whether 
such management is efficient or constitutes rational behavior in terms of a firm’s value. This issue is 
beyond our scope and should be addressed in future research. 10 
 
Cheng  (2004)  examines  whether  compensation  committees  deter  opportunistic 
reduction  in  R&D  expenses  when  facing  decision  horizon  and  myopic  problems.  The 
results show that the association between changes in R&D spending and changes in CEO 
compensation  is  significantly  positive  in  the  presence  of  these  two  problems  and  is 
insignificant  in  their  absence;  this  suggests  that  compensation  committees  respond  to 
potential opportunistic reductions in R&D spending. 
Mande et al. (2000) reveal that Japanese managers in several industries adjust their 
R&D  budgets  according  to  short term  performance.  Japanese  managers  are  believed  to 
differ from their US counterparts in terms of R&D strategy. However, the results of Mande 
et al. show that Japanese managers also have an incentive to engage in myopic behavior, as 
in the case of US managers. 
Further  research  reveals  that  the  ownership structure  provides  an  opportunity  for 
earnings management as it can affect the firms’ decision horizon. Bushee (1998) indicates 
that  concentrated  ownership  by  “transient”  institutions  with  short  investment  horizons 
significantly  increases  the  likelihood  that  managers  will  cut  R&D  to  meet  earnings 
benchmarks.  According  to  Bushee,  concentrated  institutional  ownership  with  heavy 
institutional  trading  based  on  current  earnings  leads  to  myopic  investment  behavior  by 
managers  (Bushee  1998,  p.307).  Overall,  the  results  suggest  that  decision  horizon  and 
myopic  problems  will  lead  to  opportunistic  discretionary  behavior  to  meet  short term 
earnings goals rather than to maximize long term value. 
 
2.2 Stable shareholding, investment horizon, and stable earnings string 11 
 
Bushee’s (1998) analysis is closely related to our study as he investigates the relationship 
between ownership structure and discretionary behavior. While Bushee (1998) focuses on 
the  relationship  between  shareholdings  with  short  investment  horizons  and  earnings 
management, this study examines the effect on earnings management behavior of stable 
shareholdings  with  longer  or  no  short term  investment  horizons.  A  unique  feature  of 
Japanese ownership structure is that a large number of shareholders in the Japanese equity 
market are dominated by  stable shareholding,  which comprises cross shareholdings and 
stable shareholdings by financial institutions (Hoshi et al. 1990, 1991; Aoki and Patrick 
1994; Douthett and Jung 2001; Shuto and Kitagawa 2011).   
Main  banks  are  representative  stable  shareholders  of  financial  institutions.  These 
banks have a high monitoring ability and a strong incentive to monitor firms because they 
share a close relationship with the firms as creditors. They can monitor the conditions of 
client  firms  through  information  obtained  from  account  checking,  client  firms’ 
shareholdings, and board members’ exchanges (Diamond 1984; Aoki and Patrick 1994; 
Douthett and Jung 2001; Shuto and Kitgawa 2011). Shareholders with cross shareholdings 
are also expected to have an incentive to monitor firm managers because they are the firms’ 
trade  partners  (Osano  1996;  Isagawa  2007).  Because  these  groups  of  firms  maintain 
long term relationships by exchanging equity stakes in each other, reciprocal voting rights 
are created. This also implies a credible mutual commitment among firms and ensures that 
managers  who  act  opportunistically  are  dismissed  or  demoted.  By  using  their  high 
monitoring ability, stable shareholders can control firm managers’ earnings management 
decisions. 12 
 
Studies argue that these stable shareholders can prevent managers from engaging in 
opportunistic myopic behavior and can encourage them to make long term investments or 
financial decisions focusing on their long term firm value (Abegglen and Stalk 1985; Porter 
1992; Osano 1996). Jacobson and Aaker (1993) also contend that because some prospective 
shareholders  in  Japan  are business  partners (often  from the  same industrial  group)  and 
related banks, Japanese investors with better information about the long term prospects of a 
business can detect management myopic behavior and will be more willing to accept lower 
current term earnings. In the context of our research, we expect that stable shareholders 
encourage  firm  managers  to  perform  earnings  smoothing,  which  decreases  earnings 
volatility.   
One of the reasons why stable shareholdings, particularly shareholdings by financial 
institutions, are concerned with stable earnings is their asymmetric payoff function. Debt 
holders are less likely to be concerned about the potential gains of borrowing firms because 
they have a nonlinear payoff function that restricts their claims on firm’s assets to their 
promised  payments  (i.e.,  principal  and  interest).  In  contrast,  debt  holders  have  greater 
concerns about potential losses since they could lose their principal and interest payments 
in most serious cases (i.e., bankruptcy). 
Problems that arise from the existence of different types of financial claims can be 
reduced by the shareholdings by financial institutions. Financial institutions can monitor the 
firm’s investment projects and can put pressure on managers to minimize downside risk. 
One implication is that the reduction of earnings volatility  could be useful in reducing 
downside risk. This is because greater uncertainty about profits implies a greater risk that 13 
 
excess dividends based on temporarily inflated earnings may be paid to shareholders (Watts 
1993; Ahmed et al. 2002). 
Further, because cross shareholdings strengthen the stability of firm management by 
decreasing the threat of hostile takeovers and maintaining long term business relationships, 
they permit  managers to develop operations  according to a long term  perspective. This 
perspective is likely to be consistent with the interests of the debt holders, who have greater 
concerns about the default risk of the firms (Shuto and Kitagawa 2011).
4  Thus, we predict 
that shareholders with cross holdings would also be more interested in potential losses than 
in potential gains.   
Consistent  with  these  arguments,  Nakatani  (1984)  shows  that  while  the  level  of 
keiretsu affiliated firms’ operating income is lower than that of other independent firms, its 
variation over time is significantly small for keiretsu affiliated firms than for independent 
firms.
5  We predict that stable shareholdings create this stable earnings stream through firm 
managers’ earnings management. 
 
2.3 Hypotheses development 
In  this  paper,  we  focus  on  two  types  of  earnings  management  patterns:  1)  earnings 
                                                           
4  This argument is similar to that of Anderson et al. (2003), who examine the effects of founding family 
ownership on the cost of debt. Anderson et al. (2003) argue that family shareholders are more likely than 
other shareholders to value ﬁrm survival over strict adherence to wealth maximization because they have 
a desire to pass the firm onto subsequent generations and are concerned about family and firm reputation. 
This has the effect of decreasing the potential conflict between shareholders and debt holders. 
Cross shareholdings and family shareholding have distinct similarities in that they are undiversified 
stable shareholdings that do not conduct short term share trading on the basis of temporal information. 
5  In an interpretation of the results of Nakatani (1984), he presents the implicit mutual insurance scheme 
hypothesis, which assumes that banks within the corporate group control the interest rate for related 
firms in order to stabilize these firms’ profits. However, subsequent studies do not necessarily support 
this hypothesis (Horiuchi et al. 1988; Hirota 1990). 14 
 
smoothing  and  2)  big  bath.  On  the  basis  of  the  argument  in  the  previous  section,  we 
hypothesize that stable shareholders pressurize managers to create less volatile and more 
stable earnings strings. First, we predict that stable shareholders encourage firm managers 
to conduct earnings smoothing since it decreases earnings volatility. Earnings smoothing is 
a typical earnings management pattern that seeks to reduce the variation in the reported 
income of firms over time. Thus, this argument leads to our first hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Stable shareholdings are positively associated with earnings smoothing 
behavior. 
 
Second, we predict that stable shareholders prevent firm managers from engaging in 
big bath since it increases earnings volatility. Big bath is an income decreasing strategy 
aimed at making poor earnings in the current year seem even worse. By using the property 
of accruals reversal, firm managers can artificially enhance future earnings. A big rise in 
earnings may result in a larger bonus for managers (Healy 1985). The literature also shows 
that new CEOs often use big bath because they can blame the previous CEO for the firm’s 
poor  performance  and  can  create  growth  strings  in  earnings  within  a  limited  period 
(Pourciau  1993;  Murphy  and  Zimmerman  1993).  Stable  shareholders  with  longer 
investment horizons discourage managers from using big bath since it increases earnings 
volatility within a future period. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Stable shareholdings are negatively associated with big bath behavior. 15 
 
 
In order to compare the results of stable shareholdings, we also examine the effect of 
foreign equity ownership. In the Japanese equity market, foreign shareholders are widely 
known  to  have  short term  investment  horizons  (Uno  and  Kamiyama  2010),  similar  to 
institutional ownership in the U.S. setting (Bushee 1998); therefore, we can assume that 
they have similar effects on earnings management behavior.
6  Because foreign ownership is 
expected to require earnings management for increasing short term earnings and because it 
has a contrasting effect to that of stable shareholdings, we predict that foreign ownership 
decreases  earnings  smoothing  behavior.
7   The  theoretical  relationship  between 
shareholdings,  the  decision  horizon  problem,  and  patterns  of  earnings  management  is 
summarized in Table 1 
 
 
3 Research design 
3.1 Earnings smoothing measures 
3.1.1 Earnings smoothing measures 
In  this  section,  we  describe  earnings  management  measures  with  respect  to  earnings 
                                                           
6  In addition to the analysis of stable shareholdings, the focus on foreign ownership in Japan is 
important for the following two reasons (Jiang and Kim 2004). First, as noted by Kang and Stulz (1997), 
Japan is “the only large country that we know for which detailed data on [share] holding by foreign 
investors are available” (p. 4) from published annual reports or stock guides. Second, shareholdings by 
foreign investors are, in general, restricted in Asian countries other than Japan (Jiang and Kim 2004). In 
this regard, the Japanese equity market is well suited for addressing our research concern. 
7  We cannot predict the relationship between foreign ownership and big bath behavior. As stated in the 
text, big bath is an extreme income decreasing strategy for increasing future profit. It is not an attractive 
method for foreign shareholders if their investment horizon is shorter than the income increasing cycle in 
big bath management. 16 
 
smoothing  in  our  empirical  analyses.  Specifically,  following  prior  studies  on  earnings 
management, we use three earnings management measures for earnings smoothing. 
The first measure (ES1) captures the degree to which managers reduce the variability 
of reported earnings by altering the accounting accruals; this is widely used in prior studies 
(Leuz et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2004; LaFond et al. 2007; Lang et al. 2009; Grant et al. 
2009).  Specifically,  ES1  is  defined  as  the  ratio  of  the  firm’s  standard  deviation  of  net 
income (NI) to its standard deviation of cash flows from operations (CFO) as follows: 
 
), ( / ) ( 1 CFO NI ES σ σ =  
 
where 
NI  =  net  income  before  extraordinary  items;  net  income  –  extraordinary  gains  + 
extraordinary losses 
CFO = cash flow from operations; NI – ACC 
ACC = ( current assets –  cash and cash equivalents) – ( current liabilities –   
 financing item
8) –  other allowance
9  – depreciation 
 
NI and ACC are scaled by lagged total assets. We calculate the standard deviations 
over  rolling  five year  windows.  The  lower  variability  of  earnings  with  respect  to  the 
variability in cash flow indicates greater earnings smoothing; therefore, a lower value of 
                                                           
8  ΔFinancing item is the sum of the following items: change in short term debt, change in commercial paper, 
and change in bonds and convertible bonds. 
9  ΔOther allowance is the change in allowances classified as fixed assets. 17 
 
ES1 implies greater earnings smoothness. 
Our second measure of earnings smoothing (ES2) is equal to the correlation between 
the changes in accounting accruals (ACC) and those in operating cash flows (Land and 
Lang 2002; Leuz et al. 2003; Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Myers et al. 2007; LaFond et al. 
2007; Lang et al. 2009; Grant et al. 2009). 
 
[ ], , 2  CFO  ACC ES ρ =  
 
We  calculate  ES2  over  a  period  of  five  years.  Even  in  the  absence  of  earnings 
management, the ES2 measure is expected to be negative on average because a negative 
correlation is a natural result of accrual accounting (Dechow 1994). However, we expect 
that  a  greater  negative  value  of  ES2  indicates  the  discretionary  behavior  of  earnings 
smoothing, which does not reflect a firm’s underlying economic performance (Leuz et al. 
2003; Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Myers et al. 2007). Hence, a lower ES2 value indicates a 
smoother earnings stream. 
The  third  measure  (ES3)  extends  the  definition  of  ES2.  Following  Tucker  and 
Zarowin (2006) and Grant et al. (2009), we calculate ES3 as the correlation between the 
changes in discretionary accruals (DAC) and those in non discretionary net income (NDNI). 
 




DAC = discretionary accruals by using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995)
10   
NDNI = non discretionary net income; NI – DAC. 
 
We calculate the correlation over five years again.
11  Although we face difficulty in 
observing  the  discretionary  portion  of  managerial  earnings  smoothing  behavior,  this 
measure has an advantage: it assumes that there is an underlying pre managed earnings 
series and that managers use discretionary  accruals to make the reported series smooth 
(Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Grant et al. 2009). Consequently, a more negative correlation 
on ES3 indicates greater earnings smoothing behavior. 
 
3.1.2 Big bath measures 
Regarding big bath management, we use two earnings management measures focusing on 
the sign and magnitude of managed earnings by firm managers. Prior studies reveal that 
managers engage in big bath behavior in order to enhance the probability of future earnings 
in various situations such as CEO turnover, bonus contract, and restructuring (Pourciau 
1993; Murphy and Zimmerman 1993; Healy 1985). However, in our analyses, we do not 
focus on managers’ incentives for engaging in big bath behavior and specify the situation 
where the big bath strategy is likely to be used because our primary concern is to explore 
not the managers’ motivation for engaging in big bath behavior but the variation and stream 
of earnings. 
                                                           
10  The detailed estimation method on the modified Jones model employed in this study is summarized in the 
Appendix. 
11  The five year calculation period for earnings smoothing variables used in this study is the same calculation 
period of Tucker and Zarowin (2006). Grant et al. (2009) uses a three year period for the calculation. 19 
 
Therefore,  we  define  the  big  bath  as  mere  large  income decreasing  behavior. 
Specifically, we use the following two variables (BB1 and BB2) that define the big bath 
strategy  as  income decreasing  behavior  by  utilizing  both  discretionary  accruals  and 
extraordinary items. 
BB1 is the censored variable that takes the value of the sum of the absolute value of 
discretionary  accruals  and  the  absolute  value  of  net  extraordinary  items  (extraordinary 
gains  –  extraordinary  losses)  if  both  discretionary  accruals  and  extraordinary  items  are 
negative,  and zero otherwise.  We also define BB2 as the sum of the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals and the absolute value of net extraordinary items if discretionary 
accruals and net extraordinary items exceed the median values of each variable by year, 
respectively,  and  as  zero  if  both  discretionary  accruals  and  net  extraordinary  items  are 
positive.
12 
In addition to discretionary accruals, it is critically important to consider the effect of 
extraordinary losses in measuring the big bath in Japan. Although the accounting practice of 
the big bath in Japan has not been fully explored, some valuable studies provide evidence 
suggesting that for Japanese managers, using income increasing extraordinary items is an 
inevitable method for engaging in big bath (Otomasa 1997; Shuto 2007, 2010).
13 
We  use  censored  variables  in  order  to  capture  both  the  sign  and  magnitude  of 
                                                           
12  Therefore, in our sample, observations that take the value of 0 in the definition of BB2 are equivalent to 
those taking the value of 0 in the definition of BB1. 
13  Shuto (2007) indicates that in addition to income decreasing discretionary accruals, Japanese firm 
managers who do not receive any bonus adopt income decreasing extraordinary items; further, this study 
suggests that the use of extraordinary items is as important a method as the big bath strategy for Japanese 
managers. Further, Otomasa (1997) and Shuto (2010) also provide evidence showing that firms with 
extremely bad performance are more likely to report extraordinary losses to further decrease earnings for the 
big bath. 20 
 
managed earnings. The variable setting of BB2 is a more severe definition for the big bath 
(i.e., as an income decreasing management strategy) than that of BB1; i.e., BB2 is set to 
reflect greater income decreasing earnings management. Therefore, following hypothesis 2, 
we predict that the effect of stable shareholdings on big bath is likely to be more recognized 
in the analyses using BB2 than those using BB1. 
 
3.2 Research models 
3.2.1 Research model for testing hypothesis 1 
To test hypothesis 1, we examine the association between stable shareholdings and earnings 
smoothing by estimating the following model: 
 
ε β β β β
β β β β β β α
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + + =
dummy Industry MTB CINT LOSS CYCLE
SALES CFO ASSET MO FOREIGN STABLE ES
10 9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1
  (1) 
 
ε β β β β β
β β β β β β α
+ + + + + + +
+ + + + + + =
dummy Industry MTB CINT LOSS CYCLE SALES
CFO ASSET MO FOREIGN FSTABLE CROSS ES
11 10 9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1
  (2) 
 
where 
ES = earnings smoothing measures (ES1, ES2, and ES3) 
STABLE = fraction of the shares owned by stable shareholders at the end of the fiscal   
year 
CROSS = fraction of the shares owned by cross shareholders at the end of the fiscal year 
FSTABLE = fraction of the stable shareholdings by financial institutions at the end of the 21 
 
fiscal year (i.e., FSTABLE is defined as STABLE minus CROSS) 
FOREIGN = fraction of the shares owned by foreign companies at the end of the fiscal   
year 
MO = fraction of the shares owned by directors at the end of the fiscal year 
ASSET = log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year 
CFO = standard deviation of the firm’s rolling five year cash flows from operations 
SALES = standard deviation of the firm’s rolling five year sales revenues 
CYCLE = log of the sum of the firm’s days accounts receivable ((yearly average   
accounts receivable)/(total revenue/360)) and days inventory ((yearly average   
inventory)/(cost of goods sold/360)) 
LOSS = proportion of losses over the last five years 
CINT = ratio of the net book value of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) to total   
assets at the end of the fiscal year 
MTB = book to market ratio at the end of the fiscal year 
Industry dummy = an indicator variable for the Nikkei industry classification code   
(Nikkei sangyo chu bunrui). 
 
As  described  in  the  subsection  on  earnings  smoothing  measures,  we  use  three 
variables (ES1, ES2, and ES3) to measure earnings smoothing behavior. We mainly focus 
on the stable shareholdings variable (STABLE), which is classified into cross shareholdings 
(CROSS) and stable shareholdings by financial institutions (FSTABLE). CROSS is defined 
as the fraction of shares that are owned by cross shareholders at the end of the fiscal year. 22 
 
Cross shareholders include all domestic companies listed on the Japanese stock markets at 
the end of the fiscal year. FSTABLE is calculated as the fraction of the shares owned by 
stable financial shareholders at the end of the fiscal year.
14  To compare the findings of 
stable  shareholdings,  we  include  foreign  shareholdings  (FOREIGN)  in  the  regression 
model. 
If the relationship between stable shareholdings and earnings smoothing is similar to 
the prediction of hypothesis 1, the relationship would be expected to be negative. Therefore, 
in regression model (1), the coefficient of STABLE would be expected to be negative. The 
coefficients of FSTABLE and CROSS are also expected to be negative in regression model 
(2).  Further,  we  expect  that  foreign  shareholdings  are  positively  related  to  earnings 
smoothing variables or have no impact on them. 
Following Francis et al. (2004) and Dechow and Dichev (2002), we set the control 
variables for the earnings attributes that would determine earnings volatility. Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) identify the five factors explaining the accruals’ quality: firm size (ASSET), 
cash flow variability (CFO), sales variability (SALES), operating cycle length (CYCLE), 
and incidence of negative earnings realizations (LOSS). 
Firm size is expected to be negatively associated with earnings volatility since large 
firms  have  more  stable  and  predictable  operations.  Cash  flow  variability  and  sales 
variability  would  be  positively  related  to  earnings  volatility  because  uncertainty  in  the 
                                                           
14  Stable shareholders by financial institutions include financial institutions, trust banks, other financial 
institutions (i.e., brokerage companies and securities finance companies), and parent companies. The 
definitions of these stable ownership variables depend on those in the Data Package of Cross Shareholding 
and Stable Shareholding, which is used in this study. For the details of databases used in this analyses, see the 
section on sample selection. 23 
 
operating  environment  increases  as  the  variability  increases.  Longer  operating  cycles 
involve high uncertainty, which increases  earnings volatility. The incidence of negative 
earnings realizations is expected to be positively associated with earnings volatility since 
reporting losses would indicate severe negative shocks in the firm’s operating environment. 
Consequently, earnings volatility is expected to be negatively associated with ASSET and 
positively associated with CFO, SALES, CYCLE, and LOSS. 
In addition to these control variables, following the analysis of Francis et al. (2004), 
we use two additional variables: intangible intensity (MTB) and capital intensity (CINT).
15 
Prior studies reveal that intangibles intensity is positively related to earnings persistence, 
thereby reducing earnings volatility (Baginski et al. 1999). Further, some studies provide 
evidence suggesting that capital intensive firms have greater earnings volatility because of 
higher operating leverage (Baginski et al. 1999; Lev 1983). Thus, earnings volatility is 
expected to be negatively related to MTB and positively associated with CINT. 
Finally,  as  a  control  variable,  we  use  managerial  ownership  (MO)  because  prior 
studies  show  that  managerial  ownership  is  significantly  associated  with  earnings 
management that is proxied by discretionary accruals (Warfield et al. 1995; Teshima and 
Shuto  2008).  We  cannot  predict  the  expected  sign  of  MO  because  it  is  unclear  how 
managerial  ownership  affects  the  earnings  management  pattern.  Detailed  definitions  of 
these control variables are summarized in the note of Table 3. 
 
                                                           
15  As the proxy for intangible intensity, Francis et al. (2004) use the variable based on R&D cost. However, 
we use the book to market ratio for the intangible intensity variable because the systematic data of R&D cost 
is not available until 2000 from the database used in this study. The reason for this limitation is summarized in 
footnote 16. 24 
 
3.2.2 Research model for testing hypothesis 2 
To test hypothesis 2, we examine the effect of stable shareholdings on big bath behavior by 
estimating the following model: 
 
 
ε β β β β
β β β β β β α
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + + =
dummy Industry MTB CINT LOSS CYCLE
SALES CFO ASSET MO FOREIGN STABLE BB
10 9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1
  (3) 
 
ε β β β β β
β β β β β β α
+ + + + + + +
+ + + + + + =
dummy Industry MTB CINT LOSS CYCLE SALES
CFO ASSET MO FOREIGN FSTABLE CROSS BB
11 10 9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1
   (4) 
 
where 
BB = big bath measures (BB1 and BB2). 
 
We use two variables (BB1 and BB2) to measure big bath behavior as defined in the 
subsection  on  big  bath  measures.  Following  hypothesis  2,  we  expect  that  stable 
shareholdings are negatively associated with the incidence of big bath. Thus, the coefficient 
of STABLE are expected to be negative in regression model (3), and the coefficients of 
FSTABLE and CROSS are also expected to be negative in model (4). 
 
 
4 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
4.1 Sample selection 25 
 
Our sample selection procedures are summarized in Table 2. We obtained our initial sample 
of  39,559  observations  on  stable  shareholding  from  the  Data  Package  of 
Cross shareholdings and Stable Shareholding (Kabushiki mochiai zyoukyou tyousa no kiso 
data) for 1988 2008. We deleted firms in banking, securities, insurance, and other financial 
institutions and firms whose fiscal year does not end in March; this resulted in 14,009 
observations.  We  also  excluded  4,190  observations  that  changed  the  accounting  period 
during our analysis period. We then merged the financial statement and stock data from the 
Nikkei NEEDS Financial QUEST database and eliminated the observations with negative 
total assets or negative book value of equity and missing data to calculate independent 
variables;  this  resulted  in  a  sample  of  17,091  observations.  Finally,  after  deleting  the 
observations with missing data to calculate dependent variables, we reduced our sample to 
12,681 observations for earnings smoothing analyses (ES sample) and 17,026 observations 
for big bath analyses (BB sample). 
 
【Insert Table 2 about here】 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. It shows that the 
average percentage of CROSS (FSTABLE) is 12.9 percent (16.7 percent); this means that 
the average percentage of stable shareholdings (STABLE) in the Japanese market, which 
comprises cross shareholdings and stable shareholdings by financial institutions, is 29.7 
percent.  The  descriptive  statistics  of  stable  shareholdings  are  similar  to  those  of  prior 26 
 
studies examining the stable shareholdings of Japanese firms (Shuto and Kitagawa 2011). 
 
【Insert Table 3 about here】 
 
The table  also indicates that the average percentage of FOREIGN is 8.0 percent, 
indicating  that  foreign  ownership  is  lesser  than  stable  shareholdings.  Our  untabulated 
analysis also indicates that while the value of stable shareholdings is gradually decreasing 
after the year 2000, that of foreign ownership is largely increasing during this period. 
ES1, which measures the ratio of a firm’s standard deviation of net income (NI) to its 
standard deviation of cash flows from operations, has a  mean (median) value of 0.403 
(0.311).  Both  ES2  and  ES3  are  defined  to  capture  the  correlation  between  unmanaged 
earnings and managed earnings. ES3, which measures the correlation between the changes 
in discretionary accruals and those in non discretionary net income, has a mean (median) 
value of  0.824 ( 0.900). In comparison, Tucker and Zarowin (2006) show a mean (median) 
smoothness measure of  0.71 ( 0.90), and Grant et al. (2009) report a mean (median) value 
of 0.69 (0.96). 
Table 4 presents the correlations matrix among  the variables used in this study’s 
regression models. We report the correlations matrix for variables in earnings smoothing 
analyses in panel A and that for big bath analyses in panel B. The upper right hand portion 
of the table reports the Spearman rank order correlations, and the lower left hand portion 
presents the Pearson correlations. 
 27 
 
【Insert Table 4 about here】 
 
In panel A, the Pearson correlations reveal that the STABLE variable is negatively 
correlated with ES1 ( 0.10), ES2 ( 0.08), and ES3 ( 0.05). Both CROSS and FSTABLE are 
also negatively correlated with the three earnings smoothing variables. The results suggest 
that earnings smoothing behavior by managers increases as stable shareholdings increase, 
as hypothesized. In panel B, the correlation shows that the STABLE variable is significantly 
negatively correlated with BB1 ( 0.04) and BB2 ( 0.04), suggesting that managers are less 
likely to engage in big bath behavior as stable shareholdings increase. 
 
 
5 Main results 
5.1 Stable shareholdings and earnings smoothing 
To test hypothesis 1 concerning the relationship between stable shareholdings and earnings 
smoothing, we estimated regression models (1) and (2). We used pooled regressions and 
reported t statistics based on standard errors clustered at firm and year levels following 
Petersen’s  (2009)  analyses.
16  As  described  in  section  III,  we  used  three  variables  for 
earnings smoothing (ES1, ES2, and ES3) and examined the effect of stable shareholdings 
(STABLE,  CROSS,  and  FSTABLE)  on  the  earnings  smoothing  variables.  Table  5 
                                                           
16  Petersen (2009) indicates that the standard errors clustered by firm and time can be useful to control for 
time series correlation and heteroskedasticity simultaneously. Specifically, t statistics are adjusted for 
cross sectional and intertemporal dependence using two way cluster robust standard errors proposed by 
Petersen (2009). We also use this estimation method for all the following analyses in this paper. If clustering 
of the standard errors does not allow for the inclusion of all of our currently included industry dummy 
variables, we combine at least two industry dummy variables into one industry dummy variable in order to 
estimate the regression. 28 
 
summarizes the regression results. 
 
【Insert Table 5 about here】 
 
In  columns  3–5  of  Table  5,  the  regression  results  of  model  (1)  indicate  that  the 
coefficients of STABLE are significantly and negatively associated with all the earnings 
smoothing  variables.  For  example,  in  the  third  column  (i.e.,  the  analysis  of  ES1),  the 
coefficient of STABLE is  0.117 and is significantly negative at the less than 0.01 level, as 
expected. These results hold after controlling for the other ownership structure, firm size, 
cash  flow  variability,  sales  variability,  operating  cycle  length,  incidence  of  negative 
earnings realizations, intangible intensity,  and  capital intensity. The results suggest that 
when stable shareholdings are high, managers are likely to smooth earnings; this implies 
that  stable  shareholders  serve  a  monitoring  role  in  creating  pressure  for  considering 
long term earnings strings. These findings are consistent with hypothesis 1. 
In model (2), to conduct further analyses of stable shareholdings, we divide stable 
shareholdings  into  two  ownership  structures:  cross shareholdings  (CROSS)  and  stable 
shareholdings by financial institutions (FSTABLE). The regression results are presented in 
the last three columns  of Table 5. The table shows that the coefficients of CROSS are 
significantly  negative  at  the  less than 0.01  level  in  all  models.  We  also  find  that  the 
coefficients of FSTABLE are significantly and negatively associated with all the earnings 
smoothing variables. 
In  contrast,  the  coefficients  of  FOREIGN  are  very  significantly  and  positively 29 
 
associated with the earnings smoothing variables across all models. The results suggest that 
foreign ownership does not encourage managers to smooth earnings; this is consistent with 
our prediction, which assumes that foreign shareholders induces managers to inflate their 
earnings to attain short term earnings goals. 
 
5.2 Stable shareholdings and big bath 
We estimate regression models (3) and (4) to test hypothesis 2 pertaining to the effect of 
stable shareholdings on big bath behavior. Table 6 reports the regression results. Columns 3 
and 4 of the table summarize the regression results of model (3). The table shows that 
STABLE  variables  are  negatively  and  significantly  related  to  both  BB1  and  BB2;  this 
suggests that stable shareholders could prevent firm managers from engaging in big bath. 
Therefore, the results support hypothesis 2. 
 
【Insert Table 6 about here】 
 
In the last two columns of Table 6, the coefficients of CROSS are also significantly 
and  negatively  associated  with  the  big  bath  variables.  For  example,  in  the  regression 
analysis  of  BB2,  the  coefficient  of  CROSS  is   0.071  and  significantly  negative  at  the 
less than 0.05 level. With respect to the analysis of FSTABLE, we find that while FSTABLE 
is significantly associated with BB2 as expected, it has no significant association with BB1. 
Although  it  seems  that  these  results  do  not  support  our  hypothesis,  we  would  like  to 
emphasize that all the results are consistent with our hypothesis, since BB2 is defined as a 30 
 
more income decreasing procedure than BB1 and is a stricter definition of big bath. As 
noted in section III, we presumed that the effect of ownership structure on the big bath 
strategy is reflected more in the analyses of BB2 than those of BB1. 
In  summary,  our  results  in  this  section  suggest  that  stable  shareholdings,  which 
comprise  cross shareholdings  and  stable  shareholdings  by  financial  institutions,  play  a 
monitoring  role  in  creating  pressure  to  smooth  earnings  and  in  reducing  incentives  for 
engaging in big bath. 
 
 
6 Additional Analyses 
6.1 Real discretionary behavior to meet short term earnings targets 
In  this  section,  we  examine  the  relationship  between  stable  shareholdings  and  real 
discretionary behavior to meet short term earnings targets. Prior studies provide evidence 
indicating  that  firm  managers  facing  the  problem  of  myopic  investment  behavior 
manipulate real activities, for example, reducing R&D and advertising expenses, to meet 
short term  earnings  goals  rather than  to maximize  long term  value  (Dechow  and  Sloan 
1991; Murphy and Zimmerman 1994; Bushee 1998; Detzler and Machuga 2002; Cheng 
2004). 
Bushee’s  (1998)  analyses  are  similar  to  our  study  in  that  he  focuses  on  the 
relationship between institutional ownership with short term investment horizons and real 
discretionary  behavior  (R&D).  Specifically,  he  shows  that  concentrated  ownership  by 
“transient” institutions significantly increases the probability that managers cut R&D to 31 
 
meet earnings benchmarks. 
Because  stable  shareholdings  and  Bushee’s  (1998)  institutional  ownership  are 
expected  to  have  contrary  effects  on  discretionary  behavior,  we  predict  that  stable 
shareholdings  reduce  incentives  for  managers  to  cut  discretionary  expenditures  such  as 
R&D  to  achieve  short term  earnings  goals.  Specifically,  by  employing  the  following 
regression  model,  we  investigate  whether  stable  shareholdings  restrict  managers  to 
reducing discretionary expenditures to avoid earnings losses. 
 
ε β β β β
β β β β β
β β β β α
+ + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + + =
dummy Industry MTB CINT LOSS CYCLE
SALES CFO ASSET MO FOREIGN LOSSD
STABLE LOSSD FOREIGN STABLE LOSSD ADISEXP
13 12 11 10
6 8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1
*
*
  (5) 
 
ε β β
β β β β β β
β β β
β β β β α
+ + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + +
+ + + + =
dummy Industry MTB CINT
LOSS CYCLE SALES CFO ASSET MO
FOREIGN LOSSD FSTABLE LOSSD CROSS LOSSD
FOREIGN FSTABLE CROSS LOSSD ADISEXP
15 14
13 12 11 10 9 8
7 6 5





ADISEXP = the value of abnormal discretionary expense following   
Roychowdhury’s (2006) model 
LOSSD  =  an  indicator  variable  that  takes  the  values  of  one  if  reported  earnings  are 
slightly greater than zero, and zero otherwise. 
 
This  study  extends  prior  studies  by  measuring  discretionary  expense  in  detail. 32 
 
Specifically,  we  estimate  the  abnormal  discretionary  expense  (ADISEXP)  by  using 
Roychowdhury’s  (2006)  model,  which  can  capture  abnormal  discretionary  expenditures 
comprehensively, including R&D, advertising, and promotion expenses and other selling 
costs.
17  Here, as a form of earnings management to meet short term earnings goals, we 
focus on loss avoidance.
18  LOSSD is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if 
reported earnings are slightly  greater than zero, and zero otherwise.
19  Thus, a negative 
coefficient  of  LOSSD  means  that  managers  manipulate  real  earnings  to  avoid  earnings 
losses. 
Our  primary  concern  is  the  coefficient  of  LOSSD*STABLE  (LOSSD*CROSS  and 
LOSSD*FSTABLE).  If  stable  shareholdings  prevent  firm  managers  from  reducing 
discretionary expenditures as predicted, the coefficient of LOSSD*STABLE is expected to 
be positive, which is contrary to that of LOSSD. 
The analysis in this section is restricted to firms that are sampled between 2000 and 
2008, thereby, reducing the sample size to 10,836. This is because detailed systematic data 
of research and development cost is not available for the period before the year 2000 from 
the database used in this study.
20 
                                                           
17  The detailed estimation method of Roychowdhury (2006) is summarized in the Appendix. 
18  Bushee (1998) investigates earnings management for avoiding earnings decline. We focus on the loss 
avoidance situation because most studies on Japanese firms already provide evidence that while managers 
have less incentive to use real discretionary behaviors to avoid earnings decreases, they have strong incentives 
to avoid earnings losses by using this method (Yamaguchi 2009; Tazawa 2010). 
19  We define the firms reporting earnings that are slightly greater than zero as the firms reporting earnings 
scaled by the total asset in the interval between 0 (inclusive) and 0.0058 (exclusive), which is the interval to 
the immediate left of zero in the histogram of the scaled earnings. This interval size of the histogram is based 
on the method of Freedman and Diaconis (1981] that is used in Degeorge et al. (1999). 
20  In 1998, the Business Accounting Deliberation Council, which had set forth Japanese GAAP in Japan, 
issued a new accounting standard: Accounting Standard for Research and Development Costs. This standard 
states that research and development costs should be charged to expense immediately when they are paid; this 
treatment is identical to that of U.S. GAAP. Because this new standard on R&D is applicable from March 33 
 
Table 7 presents the regression results. The negative coefficient of LOSSD means 
that managers are likely to reduce abnormal discretionary expenditures to meet short term 
earnings targets (i.e., to avoid earnings losses). The table also indicates that the coefficient 
of LOSSD*STABLE is significantly positive at the less than 0.01 level. We also find that the 
coefficients of LOSSD*FSTABLE are significant and have the expected sign. In contrast, 
the coefficient for LOSSD*FOREIGN is negative although it is not significant. 
 
【Insert Table 7 about here】 
 
Further, by using a regression model similar to model (5), we examined the effect of 
stable  shareholdings  on  the  relationship  between  discretionary  accruals,  which  reflect 
discretionary  accounting  behavior,  and  loss  avoidance.  Untabulated  results  indicate  that 
managers are less likely to manage earnings to avoid losses by using discretionary accruals 
as stable shareholdings increase. These results are consistent with our prediction and the 
results on the above abnormal discretionary expenditures. 
Therefore,  our  results  suggest  that  stable  shareholdings  that  usually  have  long 
investment horizons reduce management incentives for myopic behavior and discretionary 
expenditures for meeting short term earnings goals. 
 
6.2 Robustness of the results 
In this section, we describe other analyses conducted to verify the robustness of our results. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
2000, we restrict our sample period to when it is effective. 34 
 
First, considering the skewness of distribution of ownership variables, we used the scaled 
decile rank of independent variables, following LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008), and 
reestimated the regression model.
21  The results of STABLErank are summarized in Table 8, 
which are consistent with those of Tables 4 and 5. 
 
【Insert Table 8 about here】 
 
In  model  (1),  the  coefficients  of  STABLErank  are  significant  and  negatively 
associated  with  all  the  earnings  smoothing  variables.  Further  results  show  that  the 
coefficient of STABLErank is statistically significant in model (3). These results suggest 
that our results are robust under the analyses on the scaled decile rank. 
Second, we examined whether the results are dependent on the alternative definition 
of  STABLE.  Here,  we  used  the  mean  value  of  the  firm’s  rolling  five year  stable 
shareholdings  (STABLE  6)  instead  of  STABLE,  since  we  also  calculated  the  earnings 
smoothing variables by  using rolling  five year  windows. Table 9  reports the regression 
results, which presents the results of replicating the results in Table 5 by using STABLE 6. 
 
【Insert Table 9 about here】 
 
We  obtained  the  same  results,  as  indicated  in  Table  5.  Table  9  reveals  that  the 
                                                           
21  The scaled decile rank is determined by first ranking each observation year into ten groups from zero to 
nine, and then scaling the ranking by nine, so that the rank variable falls within the zero to one interval 
(LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008, p.16). 35 
 
coefficients of STABLE 6 are significantly negative in all models; this is consistent with our 




A unique feature of the ownership structure in the Japanese stock market is that there exist 
stable  shareholdings  such  as  cross shareholdings  and  stable  shareholdings  by  financial 
institutions. Prior studies argue that stable shareholdings create incentives for managers to 
pursue  long term  stable  earnings  and  restrict  them  to  conducting  myopic  behavior 
(Abegglen and Stalk 1985; Porter 1992; Jacobson and Aaker 1993; Osano 1996). 
In order to test the implication of the argument, we examined the effect of stable 
shareholdings  on  the  earnings  management  patterns  of  Japanese  firms.  Specifically,  we 
hypothesized  that  stable  shareholders  (1)  encourage  firm managers  to  conduct  earnings 
smoothing, which decreases earnings volatility, and (2) discourage them from engaging in 
big bath behavior, which increases earnings volatility. 
First, we found that as stable shareholdings increase, managers are likely to conduct 
earnings smoothing. Second, we revealed that managers are less likely to engage in big bath 
behavior  as  stable  shareholdings  increase.  Finally,  our  additional  analysis  showed  that 
stable shareholdings reduce incentives for managers to cut discretionary expenditures such 
as R&D and advertising expenses to meet short term earnings benchmarks; this implies that 
stable  shareholdings  could  reduce  the  possibility  of  a  myopic  problem.  These  results 
suggest that stable shareholders pressurize managers to focus on long term stable earnings 36 
 
strings and prevent them from pursuing short term earnings targets. 
This study contributes to the literature and understanding of accounting practice in 
several ways. First, we clarified how stable shareholdings with long term decision horizons 
create  an  earnings  management  pattern.  While  the  relationship  between  earnings 
management  behavior  and  an  ownership  structure  with  short term  decision  horizons  is 
already investigated (Bushee 1998), few studies examined the effect of stable shareholdings 
with long term decision horizons on earnings management behavior. 
Second, we advanced our understanding of the earnings management pattern. It is 
important to note that while some types of earnings management are allowed under certain 
ownership structures, some earnings management patterns are restricted from doing so in 
the same situation. Our findings that stable shareholdings create stable earnings strings have 
important implications for the accounting standard setting and regulation bodies. 
It must be noted that this study has certain limitations. First, we cannot deny the 
possibility that the earnings management measures used in this study have some estimation 
errors.  Second,  we  cannot  draw  implications  from  our  findings  on  whether  earnings 
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Table 2 Sample selection procedures 
     
Criteria  Firm years 
     
Firm years with data on cross shareholdings and stable shareholdings for1988
–2008
  39,559 
     
Less:   
Banks, securities firms, insurance firms, and other financial institutions  (2,451) 
Fiscal year does not end in March  (14,009) 
Change in accounting month within firm years necessary for the analyses  (4,190) 
Firm
 year with negative total assets or book value of equity  (58) 
Missing data for calculating independent variables  (1,760) 
   
  17,091 
     
  ES sample  BB sample 
  Firm years  Firm years 
     
  17,091  17,091 
Less:     
Missing data for calculating dependent variables  (4,410)  (65) 
     
Final sample  12,681  17,026 
   
Note: 
Cross shareholdings data and stable shareholdings data necessary for the study are available from the Data Package of     
Cross shareholding and Stable Shareholding (Kabushiki mochiai zyoukyou tyousa no kiso data). 
Financial statements data, managerial ownership data, and share price data necessary for the study are available from the Nikkei 
NEEDS Financial QUEST. 
The industry is based on the Nikkei industry classification code (Nikkei gyousyu chu bunrui). 






































Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
    Mean  Min  Median  Max  SD  Skewness  Kurtosis  N 
ES1    0.403    0.007    0.311    2.704    0.322    1.783    7.118    12,681 
ES2     0.879     1.000     0.900    0.300    0.198    2.587    10.723    12,681 
ES3     0.824     1.000     0.900    1.000    0.325    3.135    14.514    12,681 
BB1    0.019    0.000    0.000    0.329    0.038    3.261    17.357    17,026 
BB2    0.013    0.000    0.000    0.363    0.039    4.104    23.641    12,423 
STABLE    0.297    0.000    0.281    0.760    0.164    0.361    2.495    17,026 
CROSS    0.129    0.000    0.119    0.428    0.089    0.578    2.791    17,026 
FSTABLE    0.167    0.000    0.110    0.684    0.161    1.312    3.836    17,026 
FOREIGN    0.080    0.000    0.044    0.493    0.092    1.631    5.485    17,026 
MO    0.032    0.000    0.005    0.404    0.062    3.036    13.070    17,026 
ASSET    11.508    8.565    11.299    15.959    1.438    0.613    3.077    17,026 
CFO    0.048    0.007    0.039    0.291    0.032    1.999    8.647    17,026 
SALES    0.106    0.009    0.080    0.721    0.094    2.683    13.144    17,026 
CYCLE    4.879    2.413    5.012    6.142    0.594     1.110    4.626    17,026 
LOSS    0.178    0.000    0.000    1.000    0.243    1.329    3.977    17,026 
CINT    0.204    0.003    0.192    0.636    0.118    0.790    3.741    17,026 
MTB    1.683    0.204    1.250    31.904    1.713    6.075    71.579    17,026 
Note: 
ES1 = ratio of firm’s standard deviations of income before extraordinary items (scaled by lagged total assets) and operating cash 
flow (scaled by lagged total assets). Both variables are measured each year for each firm, using rolling five year windows; 
ES2 = the Spearman correlation between the change in accruals (scaled by lagged total assets) and the change in cash flow from 
operations (scaled by lagged total assets). Both variables are measured each year for each firm, using rolling five year windows; 
ES3 = the Spearman correlation between the change in discretionary accruals (DA) and the change in nondiscretionary income 
(NDNI). DA = discretionary accruals computed using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al, 1995). NDNI = income before 
extraordinary items (net income − extraordinary gains + extraordinary losses) minus DA. The Spearman correlation is measured 
each year for each firm, using rolling five year windows; 
BB1 = censored variable that takes the value of the sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals and the absolute value of 
net extraordinary items (extraordinary gains – extraordinary losses) if both discretionary accruals and extraordinary items are 
negative, and zero otherwise; 
BB2 = censored variable that takes the value of the sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals and the absolute value of 
net extraordinary items if discretionary accruals and net extraordinary items exceed the median values of each variable by year, 
respectively, and zero if both discretionary accruals and net extraordinary items are positive; 
STABLE = fraction of the shares owned by stable shareholders at the end of the fiscal year. Stable shareholdings are classified into 
the cross shareholdings (CROSS) and the stable shareholdings by financial institutions (FSTABLE); 
CROSS = fraction of the shares owned by cross shareholders at the end of the fiscal year; 
FSTABLE = fraction of the stable shareholdings by financial institutions at the end of the fiscal year (i.e., FSTABLE is defined as 
STABLE minus CROSS); 
FOREIGN = fraction of the shares owned by foreign companies at the end of the fiscal year; 
MO = fraction of the shares owned by directors at the end of the fiscal year; 
ASSET = log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year; 
CFO = standard deviation of the firm’s rolling five year cash flows from operations; 
SALE = standard deviation of the firm’s rolling five year sales revenues; 
CYCLE = log of the sum of the firm’s days accounts receivable (yearly average accounts receivable)/(total revenue/360)) and 
days inventory ((yearly average inventory)/(cost of goods sold/360)). If the cost of goods sold number is not reported, we use 
the total revenue minus operating income instead; 
LOSS = proportion of losses over the last five years; 
CINT = ratio of the net book value of PP&E to total assets at the end of the fiscal year; 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5 Regression results on the relationship between stable shareholdings and 
earnings smoothing 
       Model 1    Model 1    Model 1        Model 2    Model 2    Model 2 
       ES1    ES2    ES3        ES1    ES2    ES3 
Independent 
Variable 
  Expected 
Sign 
  Coefficient 
(t value) 
  Coefficient 
(t value) 
  Coefficient 
(t value) 
      Coefficient 
(t value) 
  Coefficient 
(t value) 
  Coefficient 
(t value) 
                                  Constant        0.762***     0.733***     0.716***        0.777***     0.731***     0.696*** 
        (7.865)    ( 11.456)    ( 8.006)        (8.012)    ( 11.356)    ( 7.805) 
STABLE          0.117***     0.082***     0.099***                 
        ( 3.411)    ( 3.576)    ( 2.734)                 
CROSS                          0.266***     0.106***     0.302*** 
                        ( 4.707)    ( 2.871)    ( 4.985) 
FSTABLE                          0.103***     0.079***     0.077**   
                        ( 2.910)    ( 3.438)    ( 2.040) 
FOREIGN    +    0.655***    0.187***    0.199***        0.627***    0.183***    0.162*** 
        (10.862)    (3.614)    (3.410)        (10.266)    (3.439)    (2.809) 
MO    +    0.046           0.057           0.033              0.021           0.061           0.065       
        (0.453)    ( 0.835)    ( 0.229)        (0.201)    ( 0.899)    ( 0.448) 
ASSET    +     0.042***     0.016***     0.012***         0.040***     0.016***     0.011**   
        ( 9.923)    ( 6.208)    ( 2.832)        ( 9.808)    ( 6.089)    ( 2.463) 
CFO          4.986***     1.597***     1.059***         5.005***     1.601***     1.085*** 
        ( 20.212)    ( 16.119)    ( 5.599)        ( 20.180)    ( 16.186)    ( 5.718) 
SALES         0.889***    0.271***    0.268***        0.869***    0.267***    0.240*** 
        (11.440)    (4.960)    (3.732)        (11.277)    (4.851)    (3.473) 
CYCLE         0.022          0.011           0.002              0.022          0.011           0.002       
        (1.627)    (1.094)    ( 0.158)        (1.623)    (1.093)    ( 0.160) 
LOSS         0.328***    0.149***    0.364***        0.324***    0.148***    0.359*** 
        (10.969)    (7.387)    (11.839)        (10.964)    (7.358)    (11.582) 
CINT         0.045          0.031          0.063              0.040          0.030          0.055       
        (0.717)    (0.724)    (1.028)        (0.630)    (0.700)    (0.907) 
MTB         0.017**      0.000           0.003              0.017**      0.000           0.003       
        (2.432)    (0.070)    ( 0.352)        (2.463)    (0.048)    ( 0.433)                                   
Industry dummy        Yes    Yes    Yes        Yes    Yes    Yes                                   
Adj. R
2        0.329    0.124    0.100        0.331    0.124    0.103 
N        12,681    12,681    12,681        12,681    12,681    12,681                                   
Note: 
ES1 = ratio of firm’s standard deviations of income before extraordinary items (scaled by lagged total assets) and operating cash 
flow (scaled by lagged total assets). Both variables are measured each year for each firm, using rolling five year windows; 
ES2 = the Spearman correlation between the change in accruals (scaled by lagged total assets) and the change in cash flow from 
operations (scaled by lagged total assets). Both variables are measured each year for each firm, using rolling five year windows; 
ES3 = the Spearman correlation between the change in discretionary accruals(DA) and the change in nondiscretionary income 
(NDNI). DA = discretionary accruals computed using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al, 1995). NDNI = income before 
extraordinary items (net income − extraordinary gains + extraordinary losses) minus DA. The Spearman correlation is measured 
each year for each firm, using rolling five year windows; 
STABLE = fraction of the shares owned by stable shareholders at the end of the fiscal year. Stable shareholdings are classified into 
the cross shareholdings (CROSS) and the stable shareholdings by financial institutions (FSTABLE); 
CROSS = fraction of the shares owned by cross shareholders at the end of the fiscal year; 
FSTABLE = fraction of the stable shareholdings by financial institutions at the end of the fiscal year (STABLE   CROSS); 
FOREIGN = fraction of the shares owned by foreign companies at the end of the fiscal year; 
MO = fraction of the shares owned by directors at the end of the fiscal year; 
ASSET = log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year; 
CFO = standard deviation of the firm’s rolling five year cash flows from operations; 
SALE = standard deviation of the firm’s rolling five year sales revenues; 
CYCLE = log of the sum of the firm’s days accounts receivable (yearly average accounts receivable)/(total revenue/360)) and 
days inventory ((yearly average inventory)/(cost of goods sold/360)). If the cost of goods sold number is not reported, we use 
the total revenue minus operating income instead; 
LOSS = proportion of losses over the prior last years; 
CINT = ratio of the net book value of PP&E to total assets at the end of the fiscal year; 
MTB = book to market ratio at the end of the fiscal year; 
All variables are winsorized at one percent by year. 
Industry dummy = an indicator variable for Nikkei industry classification code (Nikkei gyousyu chu bunrui) 
t statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and cross sectional and time series correlation using a two way cluster at the firm 
and year level proposed by Petersen (2009). 
*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level of significance using a two tailed t test 
** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance using a two tailed t test 
* Statistically significant at the 0.1 level. of significance using a two tailed t test 47 
 
Table 6 Regression results on the relationship between stable shareholdings and big 
bath 
        Model 3    Model 3        Model 4    Model 4 
        BB1    BB2        BB1    BB2 
Independent 
Variable 
  Expected 
Sign 
  Coefficient 
(z value) 
  Coefficient 
(z value) 
      Coefficient 
(z value) 
  Coefficient 
(z value) 
                          Constant         0.014           0.186***         0.013           0.182*** 
        ( 0.735)    ( 3.676)        ( 0.677)    ( 3.584) 
STABLE          0.009**       0.026***             
        ( 2.190)    ( 2.594)             
CROSS                      0.025*         0.071**   
                    ( 1.861)    ( 2.033) 
FSTABLE                      0.007           0.019*     
                    ( 0.867)    ( 1.907) 
FOREIGN    +    0.006          0.003              0.004           0.004       
        (0.438)    (0.088)        (0.251)    ( 0.152) 
MO          0.010           0.043               0.012           0.047       
        ( 0.549)    ( 0.934)        ( 0.665)    ( 1.046) 
ASSET          0.000          0.000               0.000          0.001       
        ( 0.586)    (0.170)        ( 0.375)    (0.392) 
CFO    +    0.342**      0.881***        0.339**      0.874*** 
        (2.444)    (2.777)        (2.412)    (2.730) 
SALES    +     0.033           0.067               0.035           0.073       
        ( 1.239)    ( 1.060)        ( 1.334)    ( 1.177) 
CYCLE    +     0.007***     0.016***         0.007***     0.016*** 
        ( 4.317)    ( 4.021)        ( 4.349)    ( 4.067) 
LOSS    +    0.041***    0.132***        0.041***    0.131*** 
        (25.413)    (31.599)        (25.445)    (31.797) 
CINT    +    0.028**      0.072**          0.027***    0.071**   
        (2.494)    (2.303)        (4.353)    (2.245) 
MTB    +     0.002***     0.002***         0.002***     0.002*** 
        ( 6.650)    ( 3.329)        ( 6.770)    ( 3.428) 
                          Industry dummy        Yes    Yes        Yes    Yes 
                          Log likelihood        1377.705     2221.568        1379.801     2219.949 
Pseudo R
2         0.320    0.128         0.322    0.129 
N        17,026    12,423        17,026    12,423 
                          Note: 
BB1 = censored variable that takes the value of the sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals and the absolute value of 
net extraordinary items (extraordinary gains – extraordinary losses) if both discretionary accruals and extraordinary items are 
negative, and zero otherwise; 
BB2 = censored variable that takes the value of the sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals and the absolute value of 
net extraordinary items if discretionary accruals and net extraordinary items exceed the median values of each variable by year, 
respectively, and zero if both discretionary accruals and net extraordinary items are positive; 
STABLE = fraction of the shares owned by stable shareholders at the end of the fiscal year. Stable shareholdings are classified into 
the cross shareholdings (CROSS) and the stable shareholdings by financial institutions (FSTABLE); 
CROSS = fraction of the shares owned by cross shareholders at the end of the fiscal year; 
FSTABLE = fraction of the stable shareholdings by financial institutions at the end of the fiscal year (STABLE   CROSS); 
FOREIGN = fraction of the shares owned by foreign companies at the end of the fiscal year; 
MO = fraction of the shares owned by directors at the end of the fiscal year; 
ASSET = log of total assets at the end of fiscal the year; 
CFO = standard deviation of the firm’s rolling five year cash flows from operations; 
SALE = standard deviation of the firm’s rolling five year sales revenues; 
CYCLE = log of the sum of the firm’s days accounts receivable (yearly average accounts receivable)/(total revenue/360)) and 
days inventory ((yearly average inventory)/(cost of goods sold/360)). If the cost of goods sold number is not reported, we use 
the total revenue minus operating income instead; 
LOSS = proportion of losses over the last five years; 
CINT = ratio of the net book value of PP&E to total assets at the end of the fiscal year; 
MTB = book to market ratio at the end of the fiscal year; 
All variables are winsorized at one percent by year. 
Industry dummy = an indicator variable for Nikkei industry classification code (Nikkei gyousyu chu bunrui) 
z statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and cross sectional and time series correlation using a two way cluster at the firm 
and year level proposed by Petersen (2009). 
*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level of significance using a two tailed z test 
** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance using a two tailed z test 
* Statistically significant at the 0.1 level. of significance using a two tailed z test 
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Table 7 Regressions results on the relationship between stable shareholdings and 
abnormal discretionary expenses 
        Model 5        Model 6 
        ADISEXP        ADISEXP 
Independent 
Variable 
  Expected 
Sign 
  Coefficient 
(t value) 
      Coefficient 
(t value) 
                  Constant        0.036              0.040       
        (1.418)        (1.551) 
LOSSD          0.012**           0.014**   
        ( 2.498)        ( 2.192) 
STABLE    +     0.024**           
        ( 2.133)         
CROSS    +             0.055*** 
                ( 2.881) 
FSTABLE    +             0.021*   
                ( 1.925) 
FOREIGN         0.009              0.006       
        (0.506)        (0.304) 
LOSSD* STABLE    +    0.026**           
        (2.106)         
LOSSD* CROSS    +            0.041       
                (1.359) 
LOSSD* FSTABLE    +            0.026**   
                (2.449) 
LOSSD* FOREIGN          0.038               0.036       
        ( 1.382)        ( 1.325) 
MO    +    0.031              0.026       
        (1.114)        (0.948) 
ASSET    +     0.000               0.000       
        ( 0.165)        ( 0.017) 
CFO         0.048              0.043       
        (1.393)        (1.247) 
SALES          0.050***         0.054*** 
        ( 3.422)        ( 3.665) 
CYCLE          0.007               0.007       
        ( 1.446)        ( 1.462) 
LOSS          0.004               0.004       
        ( 0.686)        ( 0.721) 
CINT          0.036**           0.037*** 
        ( 2.549)        ( 2.604) 
MTB         0.004**          0.003**   
        (2.419)        (2.268)                   
Industry dummy        Yes        Yes                   
Adj. R
2        0.024        0.026 
N        10,836        10,836                   
Note: 
ADISEXP = the value of abnormal discretionary expense; 
LOSSD = an indicator variable that takes the values of one if the firm has scaled earnings in the interval between 0 (inclusive) and 
0.0058 (exclusive), and zero otherwise.; 
STABLE = fraction of the stable shareholdings by financial institutions and non financial companies at the end of fiscal year. 
CROSS = fraction of the shares owned by cross shareholders at the end of fiscal year; 
STABLE = fraction of the shares owned by stable shareholders at the end of the fiscal year. Stable shareholdings are classified into 
the cross shareholdings (CROSS) and the stable shareholdings by financial institutions (FSTABLE); 
FOREIGN = fraction of the shares owned by foreign companies at the end of the fiscal year. 
MO = fraction of the shares owned by directors at the end of the fiscal year; 
ASSET = log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year; 
CFO = standard deviation of the firm’s rolling five year cash flows from operations; 
SALE = standard deviation of the firm’s rolling five year sales revenues; 
CYCLE = log of the sum of the firm’s days accounts receivable (yearly average accounts receivable)/(total revenue/360)) and 
days inventory ((yearly average inventory)/(cost of goods sold/360)). If the cost of goods sold number is not reported, we use 
the total revenue minus operating income instead; 
LOSS = proportion of losses over the last five years; 
CINT = ratio of the net book value of PP&E to total assets at the end of the fiscal year; 
MTB = book to market ratio at the end of the fiscal year; 
All variables are winsorized at one percent by year. 
Industry dummy = an indicator variable for Nikkei industry classification code (Nikkei gyousyu chu bunrui) 49 
 
t statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and cross sectional and time series correlation using a two way cluster at the firm 
and year level proposed by Petersen (2009). 
*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level of significance using a two tailed t test 
** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance using a two tailed t test 














































Table 8 Regression results on the relationship between stable shareholdings and 
earnings smoothing and big bath: Results using the scaled decile rank variables 
      Model 1    Model 1    Model 1        Model 3    Model 3 
      ES1    ES2    ES3        BB1    BB2 
Independent 
Variable 
  Expected 
Sign 
  Coefficient 
(t value) 
  Coefficient 
(t value) 
  Coefficient 
(t value) 
      Coefficient 
(t value) 
  Coefficient 
(t value) 
                              Constant        0.337***     0.894***     0.877***         0.064***     0.299*** 
        (8.212)    ( 29.349)    ( 22.709)        ( 17.418)    ( 9.232) 
STABLErank          0.034**     0.020**       0.031*            0.000           0.007**   
        ( 2.237)    ( 1.975)    ( 1.933)        (0.160)    ( 2.018) 
FOREIGNrank    +    0.163***    0.059***    0.029              0.001           0.005       
        (8.711)    (4.080)    (1.511)        (0.617)    ( 0.430) 
MOrank    +    0.021          0.006           0.014              0.005**      0.001       
        (0.946)    (0.407)    ( 0.503)        (2.044)    (0.395) 
ASSETrank    +     0.173***     0.065***     0.045**          0.004*        0.013*** 
        ( 7.930)    ( 5.236)    ( 2.055)        (1.712)    (2.792) 
CFOrank          0.517***     0.166***     0.108***        0.034***    0.112*** 
        ( 24.800)    ( 15.298)    ( 7.074)        (36.206)    (3.010) 
SALESrank         0.236***    0.075***    0.042**           0.006***     0.020*** 
        (11.731)    (7.308)    (2.309)        ( 4.845)    ( 6.457) 
CYCLErank         0.056**      0.030**      0.006               0.015***     0.032*** 
        (2.542)    (1.976)    (0.252)        ( 6.812)    ( 6.982) 
LOSSrank         0.233***    0.105***    0.236***        0.027***    0.093*** 
        (15.411)    (9.318)    (10.264)        (26.735)    (31.359) 
CINTrank         0.048**      0.025*        0.034              0.013***    0.041*** 
        (2.358)    (1.816)    (1.407)        (5.877)    (9.423) 
MTBrank         0.107***    0.012          0.032*            0.008***    0.023*** 
        (5.379)    (1.062)    (1.699)        (5.902)    (7.179)                               
Industry dummy        Yes    Yes    Yes        Yes    Yes                               
Adj. R
2        0.381    0.137    0.099             
Log likelihood                        1365.974     2193.179 
Pseudo R
2                         0.309    0.139 
N
2        12,681    12,681    12,681        17,026    12,423 
                              Note: 
ES1 = ratio of firm’s standard deviations of income before extraordinary items (scaled by lagged total assets) and operating cash 
flow (scaled by lagged total assets). Both variables are measured each year for each firm, using rolling five year windows; 
ES2 = the Spearman correlation between the change in accruals (scaled by lagged total assets) and the change in cash flow from 
operations (scaled by lagged total assets). Both variables are measured each year for each firm, using rolling five year windows; 
ES3 = the Spearman correlation between the change in discretionary accruals (DA) and the change in nondiscretionary income 
(NDNI). DA = discretionary accruals computed using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). NDNI = income before 
extraordinary items (net income − extraordinary gains + extraordinary losses) minus DA. The Spearman correlation is measured 
each year for each firm, using rolling five year windows; 
BB1 = censored variable that takes the value of the sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals and the absolute value of 
net extraordinary items (extraordinary gains – extraordinary losses) if both discretionary accruals and extraordinary items are 
negative, and zero otherwise; 
BB2 = censored variable that takes the value of the sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals and the absolute value of 
net extraordinary items if discretionary accruals and net extraordinary items exceed the median values of each variable by year, 
respectively, and zero if both discretionary accruals and net extraordinary items are positive; 
STABLErank = scaled decile rank of fraction of the shares owned by stable shareholders at the end of the fiscal year. Stable 
shareholdings are classified into the cross shareholdings (CROSS) and the stable shareholdings by financial institutions 
(FSTABLE); 
FOREIGNrank = scaled decile rank of fraction of the shares owned by foreign companies at the end of the fiscal year. 
MOrank = scaled decile rank of fraction of the shares owned by directors at the end of the fiscal year; 
ASSETrank = scaled decile rank of log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year; 
CFOrank = scaled decile rank of standard deviation of the firm’s rolling five year cash flows from operations; 
SALErank = scaled decile rank of standard deviation of the firm’s rolling five year sales revenues; 
CYCLErank = scaled decile rank of log of the sum of the firm’s days accounts receivable (yearly average accounts 
receivable)/(total revenue/360)) and days inventory ((yearly average inventory)/(cost of goods sold/360)). If the cost of goods 
sold number is not reported, we use the total revenue minus operating income instead; 
LOSSrank = scaled decile rank of proportion of losses over the last five years; 
CINTrank = scaled decile rank of the ratio of the net book value of PP&E to total assets at the end of the fiscal year; 
MTBrank = scaled decile rank of book to market ratio at the end of the fiscal year; 
The scaled decile rank is determined by first ranking each observation year into ten groups from zero to nine, and then scaling the 
ranking by nine. 
All variables (except for scaled decile rank variables) are winsorized at one percent by year. 
Industry dummy = an indicator variable for Nikkei industry classification code (Nikkei gyousyu chu bunrui) 
t statistics (z statistics) are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and cross sectional and time series correlation using a two way cluster 51 
 
at the firm and year level proposed by Petersen (2009). 
*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level of significance using a two tailed t test (z test). 
** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance using a two tailed t test (z test). 
















































Table 9 Regression results on the relationship between stable shareholdings and 
earnings smoothing: Results using the alternative definition on ownership variables 
        Model 18    Model 19    Model 20   
        ES1    ES2    ES3   
Independent 
Variable 
  Expected 
Sign 
  Coefficient 
(t value) 
  Coefficient 
(t value) 
  Coefficient 
(t value) 
 
                    Constant        0.773***     0.715***     0.712***   
        (8.055)    ( 11.089)    ( 7.968)   
STABLE 6          0.129***     0.078***     0.093**     
        ( 3.488)    ( 3.009)    ( 2.254)   
FOREIGN5    +    0.730***    0.271***    0.256***   
        (9.687)    (4.044)    (3.019)   
MO5    +    0.032           0.081           0.037         
        (0.321)    ( 1.176)    ( 0.260)   
ASSET    +     0.041***     0.018***     0.014***   
        ( 10.209)    ( 6.970)    ( 3.069)   
CFO          5.020***     1.603***     1.065***   
        ( 19.514)    ( 15.944)    ( 5.383)   
SALES         0.915***    0.276***    0.273***   
        (11.362)    (4.910)    (3.699)   
CYCLE         0.019          0.011           0.001         
        (1.396)    (1.093)    ( 0.081)   
LOSS         0.318***    0.150***    0.361***   
        (10.622)    (7.213)    (11.552)   
CINT         0.039          0.039          0.072         
        (0.616)    (0.928)    (1.136)   
MTB         0.022***    0.001           0.000         
        (2.670)    (0.475)    ( 0.051)                       
Industry dummy        Yes    Yes    Yes                       
Adj. R
2        0.325    0.124    0.100   
N        12,266    12,266    12,266   
                    Note: 
ES1 = ratio of firm’s standard deviations of income before extraordinary items (scaled by lagged total assets) and operating cash 
flow (scaled by lagged total assets). Both variables are measured each year for each firm, using rolling five year windows; 
ES2 = the Spearman correlation between the change in accruals (scaled by lagged total assets) and the change in cash flow from 
operations (scaled by lagged total assets). Both variables are measured each year for each firm, using rolling five year windows; 
ES3 = the Spearman correlation between the change in discretionary accruals (DA) and the change in nondiscretionary income 
(NDNI). DA = discretionary accruals computed using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). NDNI = income before 
extraordinary items (net income − extraordinary gains + extraordinary losses) minus DA. The Spearman correlation is measured 
each year for each firm, using rolling five year windows; 
STABLE5 = mean of the firm’s rolling five year STABLE; 
FOREIG5 = mean of the firm’s rolling five year FOREIGN; 
MO5 = mean of the firm’s rolling five year MO; 
ASSET = log of total assets at the end of fiscal year; 
CFO = standard deviation of the firm’s rolling five year cash flows from operations; 
SALE = standard deviation of the firm’s rolling five year sales revenues; 
CYCLE = log of the sum of the firm’s days accounts receivable (yearly average accounts receivable)/(total revenue/360)) and 
days inventory ((yearly average inventory)/(cost of goods sold/360)). If the cost of goods sold number is not reported, we use 
the total revenue minus operating income instead; 
LOSS = proportion of losses over the last five years; 
CINT = ratio of the net book value of PP&E to total assets at the end of the fiscal year; 
MTB = book to market ratio at the end of the fiscal year; 
All variables are winsorized at one percent by year. 
Industry dummy = an indicator variable for Nikkei industry classification code (Nikkei gyousyu chu bunrui) 
t statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and cross sectional and time series correlation using a two way cluster at the firm 
and year level proposed by Petersen (2009). 
*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level of significance using a two tailed t test 
** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance using a two tailed t test 




Appendix Measurement of discretionary accruals and abnormal discretionary expenses 
 
Discretionary accruals 
We estimated discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 
[1995]). The model is a regression of total accruals (TAC) on the change in revenue 
adjusted for the change in receivables ( REV –  REC), the levels of property, plant, and 
equipment (PPE). 
 
TAC = α + β1( REV –  REC) + β2PPE + ε, 
 
where   
TAC = [( current assets −  cash and cash equivalents) − ( current   
liabilities −  financing item) −  other allowance – depreciation] divided by 
total assets at the previous year; 
 REV = change in sales revenues divided by total assets at the previous year; 
 REC = change in accounting receivables divided by total assets at the previous 
year; 
PPE = gross property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets at the previous 
year. 
 
The  model  is  estimated  cross sectionally  for  each  industry  in  a  given  year 
according to the Nikkei industry classification code (Nikkei gyousyu chu bunrui). Using 
the estimated coefficients of the model, we measured nondiscretionary accruals (NDA). 
The  difference  between  total  accruals  and  measured  nondiscretionary  accruals  is  a  
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proxy for discretionary accruals (DA). 
 
Abnormal discretionary expense 
We  estimated  abnormal  discretionary  expense  using  Roychowdhury’s  [2006]  model. 
The model is a regression of discretionary expense (DISEXP) on the sales revenues 
(SALE). We set the missing data for the discretionary expense items equal to zero. 
 
DISEXP = α + β1A + β2SALE + ε, 
 
where   
DISEXP = (research and development expenditure + advertising expense, promotion 
expenses and other selling costs＋labor cost and welfare expense + salary 
and bonus for directors) divided by total assets at the previous year 
 
A = the value of one divided by total assets at the previous year 
SALE = sales revenues at the previous year divided by total assets at the previous 
year. 
 
The  model  is  estimated  cross sectionally  for  each  industry  in  a  given  year 
according  to  the  Nikkei  industry  classification  code  (Nikkei  gyousyu  chu bunrui). 
Similar  to  the  NDA  estimation,  we  measured  the  normal  discretionary  expense 
(NDISEXP) using the model’s estimated coefficients. The difference between DISEXP 
and measured NDISEXP is a proxy for abnormal discretionary expense (ADISEXP). 